Copyright
2017 Graham Berrisford. One of more than 300 papers at http://avancier.website.
Last updated 09/01/2021 15:40
This article is a
supplement to this psycho-biological philosophy of systems
which starts as follows.
A map is an abstract model or representation of a physical territory.
The triangle below relates maps to the territories they represent.
|
Cartography |
|
Maps <create and use> <represent> Mappers <observe and envisage> Territories |
The more general triangle below relates describers and descriptions to what is described.
|
Episteomology |
|
Descriptions <create and use> <represent> Describers
<observe
and envisage> Phenomena |
This article reviews other philosophical triangles and revises them to match our epistemological triangle.
E.g. it revises the classic semiotic triangle, and Peirce’s triadic sign relation, to match the new triangle.
This is not to say the existing triangles are “wrong”; all of them are mental models.
It is to suggest that, revised as suggested here, the other triangles are simpler and clearer (or perhaps, they should be turned into squares).
Contents
Our
epistemological triangle (repeated from https://lnkd.in/dQNhNbd)
Two dualistic
views of description and reality
Four
triangular views of description and reality – in short
What’s wrong with
the ISO/IEC 42010 standard? In short…
Appendix 1:
Four triangular views of description and reality – at length…
Ogden and
Richards’ semiotic triangle
Peirce’s
triadic sign relation
Karl Popper’s
three worlds view
Pierre
Bordieu's three relations of knowledge
Appendix 2:
What’s wrong with the ISO/IEC 42010 standard? At length…
Epistemology is
about what we know of reality, through observation, testing, reasoning and
learning from others.
This article uses this
triangle to relate epistemological concepts.
|
Epistemology |
|
Descriptions <create and
use> <represent> Describers <observe and envisage> Phenomena |
The triangle is only simple graphical device,
telling a small part of the story
The semantics of the triangle are defined
below.
Describers
are actors (natural or artificial) that can encode and decode descriptive
models of phenomena.
Descriptions embrace all forms of
mental, documented, digital and physical models.
Phenomena are entities, events and
processes that can be observed or envisaged in time and space.
The relationship between each pair of
concepts is many-to-many.
One describer can create several descriptions
of the same thing.
Those descriptions may be compatible or in conflict (is light waves or particles?).
Also, several describers can contribute to creating one description of the same thing.
It may well be that none of those describers (e.g. system architects) can hold the whole description in mind.
Both describers and descriptions can be observed as phenomena .
Describers are physical actors (natural or artificial), which may be described.
Descriptions are physical matter/energy structures, which can be described.
To describe a thing is to classify it (after
A J Ayer).
A description represents, specifies or
idealises a thing that embodies or instantiates the description.
A class or type represents, specifies or idealises a thing that embodies or instantiates the type.
A type is a description; a description is a type.
“Intensional definition” is the process of
creating a type or description.
A description expresses a type in the symbols of a particular language.
What gives the description meaning is the action of an actor in creating or using it.
Encoding is the process of creating the
symbols.
Decoding is the process of reading and using
the symbols.
(The encoding and decoding of information is a theme of cybernetics, after Ashby.
See article/chapter 4 for that and others ideas drawn from Ashby’s cybernetics.
Many don’t at first grasp the radical nature
of this psycho-biological and cybernetic view of description and reality.
Note especially
·
Descriptions in the mind are at the top (not the
left)
· Descriptions are often recoded into other descriptions
· Descriptions are physical phenomena
Look
to the right-hand side of the triangular relation.
Descriptions embrace all kinds mental and digital models, speech and writings, paintings and physical models.
A phenomenon is anything that can be observed or envisaged in time and space, including descriptions and describers.
|
Epistemology |
|
Descriptions <create and use> <represent> Describers <observe and envisage> Phenomena |
Descriptions in the mind are at the top
(not the left)
Descriptions at the apex of the triangle can
take any form.
They embrace all kinds mental and digital models, speech and writings, paintings and physical models.
They can be mental models, documented models, 3D models, in the head, on the page, carved in stone
It makes no difference.
All are created and used to describe something that a describer observes or envisages.
All carry information about whatever they represent.
All are elements found in the human phenome.
In biology, descriptions in internal memories and external messages are different.
In software, they are much the same.
All are similar in that they are created to be used by a recaller or receiver.
Look
to the left-hand side of the triangular relation.
Describers are actors (natural or artificial) that can encode and decode descriptive models of phenomena.
Descriptions embrace all kinds mental and digital models, speech and writings, paintings and physical models.
|
Epistemology |
|
Descriptions <create and use>
<represent> Describers <observe
and envisage> Phenomena |
Descriptions are often recoded into other
descriptions
Models that mimic reality (e.g. a model airplane) are recognisable using the basic
senses.
Models that are encoded or symbolized can only by recognised by a machine that knows the code.
Moving from the senses to the head, the head to the page, the page to the head, are all recoding processes.
Ashby observed that in thought and communication “coding is ubiquitous”.
To create a description is to encode a model (mental, documented or other) that represents some feature(s) of a phenomenon.
To use a description is to decode a model, and use it in any way, perhaps to respond manipulate whatever is described.
Thinking and communicating are processes that
involve translating description from one form to another.
However, the triangle cannot possibly show
everything, e.g. the multiple recodings
involved in thought or communication.
Look
to the bottom side of the triangular relation.
Describers are actors (natural or artificial) that have the ability to encode and decode descriptive models of phenomena.
A phenomenon is anything that can be observed or envisaged in time and space, including descriptions and describers.
|
Epistemology |
|
Descriptions <create and use> <represent> Describers <observe
and envisage> Phenomena |
Descriptions are physical phenomena
Many copies of a description can be created
and used.
If all copies are deleted then the description disappears from the cosmos.
In other words, there is no ethereal description aside from what exists in one or more copies of it.
Describers may observe a house, a
horse, and the largest known prime number, which all exist in time and space,
in material reality.
The types “prime number” and “largest known prime” exist in countless minds and records.
The latest instance of “largest known prime” can be envisaged as the output of an algorithm.
But it exists only in records, because it is too large for a human to remember (in 2018 it had more than 23 million digits).
Describers can also envisage stuff that might possibly exist.
E,g, a unicorn (a fantasy) or the next prime number beyond today’s largest known prime.
Neither exist in material reality today, but they and infinite other possibilities may be described.
Some portions or aspects of the cosmos may never be envisaged or observed by describers.
Conversely, some phenomena envisaged by describers (e.g. unicorns) may never be realized in the cosmos.
Their descriptions exist, but will forever remain inconsistent with reality.
This article starts by saying “holism is not wholeism” and “the map is the territory we understand”.
All written here about systems is based on the idea that systems are patterns we abstract from physical phenomena.
This reflects the outcome of a famous debate between two mathematicians about the meaning of descriptions.
Another mathematician (to help me) has distilled the argument thus.
Frege posited that descriptions (axioms) are imperfect representations of thoughts.
And that mathematics is carried out at the level of thoughts rather than descriptions.
The presumption is that we know what geometric entities, such as points and lines, actually are.
Hilbert said that, even if we did know, this is irrelevant to understanding of geometry.
Since geometry merely defines some relations between some entities.
He argues mathematics is carried out at the level of descriptions or models.
In geometry, a description is a holistic model - it asserts that particular relationships exist between basic, unanalysed, entities
Those entities can be anything (large or small) that follow the relationships stipulated in the model.
Hilbert is now regarded as the winner of the debate, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege-hilbert/
I am told the debate is whether you regard what is described in geometry as
· a concrete entity, of which every detail is potentially relevant to answering questions about it
· an abstract set of relationships between unanalysed entities.
In other words, does geometry addresses the whole of a
thing (Frege), or only selected features of it that are describable by geometry
(Hilbert).
As related articles show, the cybernetic answer to
this question is firmly in the Hilbert camp.
Activity system thinking doesn’t address the whole of
a thing.
It addresses only those features of a physical entity
that can be represented in an abstract system description.
|
Activity systems thinking |
|
Abstract systems <create and use>
<represent> Systems
thinkers <observe and
envisage> Physical systems |
We’ll return to system architecture definition later.
Before we study triangular views, here are brief notes on two dualisms.
Cartesian dualism (after Descartes) is also based on the theory that the universe is composed of two essential substances:
· Res Cogitans: the internal or mental world – commonly called mind
· Res Extensa: the external or physical world – commonly called matter.
Arguably Cartesian dualism is really a triad - the third element being the sensors and motors of the body.
|
Cartesian dualism |
|
Minds <conceptualize> Matter And bodily sensors and motors? |
Descartes saw the mind as separate from the body.
He presumed mind and matter interact via the body.
And
having decided the physical body cannot think, he was led to declare the mind
can exist outside of the body!
Many people’s instinct is still to divide the universe into mental and
physical worlds.
But
today, cognitive psychologists see the mind as an organ
of body
And philosophers and scientists see this two-way mental/physical dichotomy as naive.
"Saussure proposed the new science semiology— later called semiotics, the science of signs.”
Saussure held that definitions of concepts cannot exist independently from a linguistic system defined by difference.
Or, to put it differently, that a concept of something cannot exist without being named."
"These various movements often lead to the notion that language 'constitutes' reality,
a position contrary to intuition and to most of the Western tradition of philosophy." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn
Descriptions, and symbols within them, are called “signs” in semiotics.
Semiology or semiotics is the study the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation.
Saussure’s
semiotics featured a two-way relation.
|
Saussure’s dyadic sign relation |
|
Signified concepts <are signified by> Signifiers/symbols Where
are the signifiers? |
In other words: mental models <are signified by> physical models/words.
Others found this two-way view of semiotics too narrow, and developed richer triangular models.
Semiotics emerged from a linguistic paradigm that differentiates
· organic/biological patterns (as in neural systems)
· inorganic/physical patterns (as in sound waves or gestures).
The four triangles below have been proposed; none are wholly satisfactory.
Some are not well explained. (On Peirce: "a baffling array of under-explained terminology." SEP)
Some put internal mental descriptions and external spoken or written descriptions in different corners of their triangle.
All four triangles look clearer (to me anyway) when revised to match ours.
|
Ogden and Richard’s Semiotic Triangle |
Charles Peirce’s triadic sign relation |
Karl Popper’s
three worlds view |
Pierre Bordieu’s three relations of knowledge |
|
Symbols <are
symbolised by> <stand
for> References <refer
to> Referents |
Signs <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpretants <refer to> Objects |
3: Products of the mind <produces> <describes/predicts> 2: Mental world <observes
and envisages> 1: Physical reality |
Knowledge <social> <epistemic> Knower <objectify> Known |
|
Issue: structures
in the brain are symbols. Our version moves mental symbols to the apex. |
Issue:
structures in interpreters’ minds are signs. Our version moves mental signs
to the apex. |
Issue:
structures in the mental world are products of the mind. Our version moves
mental models to the apex. |
Issue:
knowledge is contained in both memories and messages. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
Revised to match
our triangle |
Revised to match
our triangle |
Revised to match our triangle |
|
Symbols (inc.
references) <create and
use> <stand for> Referees <refer
to> Referents |
Signs (inc. interpretants) <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpreters <observe and envisage> Objects |
Products of the mind <create
and use>
<represent> Minds
<observe and envisage>
Physical entity |
Knowledge <create
and use>
<represent> Actors <observe> Known things |
Our epistemological triangle moves from a sociological viewpoint to a psycho-biological one.
From the sociological: actors with a memory <express ideas using> messages to <represent> phenomena.
To the psycho-biological: actors with an intelligence <create and use> memories and messages to <represent> phenomena.
To us, all patterns (internal and external) created and used by organisms to represent things are at the apex of the triangle.
Read appendix 1 for a longer version of the analysis here.
The ISO/IEC 42010 standard is for the architectural description of software-intensive systems.
Wrt
“Architecture” it makes no sense.
“This International Standard takes no position on what constitutes a system... The nature of systems is not defined.”
“For a system of interest to you, the Standard provides guidance for
documenting an architecture for that system."
“Architecture
description: work product used to express an
architecture".
“Architecture: fundamental
concepts or properties of a system in its environment embodied in its elements,
relationships, and in the principles of its design and evolution.”
How
to distinguish concepts or properties that are fundamental from
other ones?
Are
the concepts or properties of a system different when the system is not in
its environment? What would that mean?
Where are the concepts or properties embodied?
In the Architecture? In the Architecture Description? In the System?
Surely
elements and relationships are merely instances of concepts and
properties?
Surely
principles are external guidelines for defining the Architecture,
embodied in its concepts and properties?
The main concern here is the way
the standard relates three concepts in 1-1 associations.
|
The ISO/IEC 42010 standard |
|
1 Architecture Description <is expressed
in>
<identifies> 1 Architecture <is exhibited in> 1
System |
We can see description and reality in terms of types
and instances.
1.
a
type - concepts or properties expressed in an intensional definition.
2.
an
instance – concepts or properties embodied in an observed or
envisaged thing.
A
type IS an intensional definition, a model/description, of an instance’s
properties.
A
concept/property of a thing IS a model/description of that thing’s properties.
An
architecture of a system IS a model/description of that system’s properties.
Where
do we find models/descriptions of reality?
We
find them in minds, in writings, and other forms.
One
system may be described in several models/descriptions.
And
one documented model/description may coordinate several, partial, mental
models/descriptions.
That
last is very likely to be the case for an Architecture Description.
In the worlds of business and software architecture, we can see
1.
Architecture Descriptions that express and relate
architectural property types.
2. Physical systems – realized by enterprises – that embody or exhibit architectural property types in particular instances.
If the Architecture expresses and
relates property types, then it is an Architecture Description.
If the Architecture embodies or
exhibits property types, then it is a System.
If it does neither then what is it,
and where is it?
An
ISO standard editor told me “An Architecture Description describes the
Architecture of a System”.
But
while people do speak loosely, and may well formulate that sentence, it is
tautologous.
More
accurately: “An Architecture Description sets out concepts or properties that a
System that will embody.”
That
is all we need to discuss; so better, revise the concept graph thus.
|
System
architecture |
|
|
1 Architecture
Description <create and use> <represents> N Architects <observe
and envisage> N Systems |
|
Suppose
we posit a metaphysical Architecture – not found in a model/description.
Which
of several mental and documented models/descriptions does it correspond to?
How
do we know what the Architecture contains? What use is it?
It
is redundant - a pointless piece of nonsense.
Oddly
Since the standard does not take any view of what a system
is, it can be applied to any designed thing.
Since it does not say which concepts and properties are
fundamental to architecture, it can be applied to any documented design.
In fact, it can be applied to anything whose documented
description must address the concerns of stakeholders.
You can change all "architecture" to "design" without affecting its practical application.
And generalize its triangular relation thus.
|
Design |
|
Designs <create and
use>
<represent> Designers
<observe and envisage> Designed things |
Read appendix 2 for a longer
version of the argument here.
This article is a
supplement to this psycho-biological philosophy of systems.
Where this general triangle is used to relate describers and descriptions to what is described.
|
Episteomology |
|
Descriptions <create and use> <represent> Describers
<observe
and envisage> Phenomena |
This article reviews other philosophical triangles and revises them to match our epistemological triangle.
E.g. it revises the classic semiotic triangle, and Peirce’s triadic sign relation, to match the new triangle.
This is not to say the existing triangles are “wrong”; all of them are mental models.
It is to suggest that, revised as suggested here, the other triangles are simpler and clearer (or perhaps, they should be turned into squares).
Finally, people ask about my personal view of other philosophers.
At the risk of upsetting people, here are some glib thoughts.
· Plato, Aristotle and Descarte – superseded.
· Metaphysical and theological philosophy (e.g. Kierkgaard) - on a different planet.
· Political philosophy (e.g. Engels and de Beauvoir) - tendentious.
· Linguistic-based philosophy – too human-centric.
· Heraclitus and Kant – close to my philosophy
· Charles Darwin and W Ross Ashby - my touchstones.
Descartes’s view might be distilled as: mental references <are symbolised by> physical symbols, which <stand for> physical things referred to.
In “The Meaning of Meaning” (Odgen & Richards, 1923) the authors drew what might look like similar triangular structure.
However, the semiotic triangle below is rather different from Descartes.
A reference appears to be a thought or concept, as symbolised in the mind.
|
Ogden and Richard’s Semiotic Triangle |
|
Symbols <are
symbolised by> <stand
for> References <refer
to> Referents |
|
Issue:
structures in the brain are symbols. Our version moves mental symbols to the
apex. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
|
Symbols (inc.
references) <create
and use> <stand
for> Referees <refer
to> Referents |
A referent is something to which a symbol can refer.
A symbol is a sign (word or other representation) of something – to a creator or user of that symbol, and in a language they use.
A reference is said to be a thought or concept (as symbolised in the mind?).
On the need for language
When reading the semiotic triangle, a linguist may assume the symbols are verbal.
Of course, we and other animals can remember and communicate meaningful information without words.
The meaning of both verbal and non-verbal symbols is language dependent.
The referent/object referred to by a symbol/word depends on the language used.
Conversely, the symbol/word used to symbolise a referent/object depends on the language used.
On the need for language users
The “refer to” and “symbolised by” relations hint at processes performed by intelligent actors.
There must be actors who can not only perceive referents, and read symbols that stand for them, but also interpret those symbols using a language.
Charles Peirce (1931-1958) had similar notion to the semiotic triangle.
Sometimes it seems he conflate a describer, their intelligence, thoughts and memories into “interpretant”.
Other times it seems as though the interpretant is only a thought, concept or mental sign.
|
Charles Peirce’s
triadic sign relation |
|
Signs <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpretants <refer to> Objects |
|
Issue:
structures in interpreters’ minds are signs. Our version moves mental signs
to the apex. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
|
Signs (inc. interpretants) <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpreters <observe and envisage> Objects |
Like other philosophers, Peirce made life hard for his readers by changing his terms and their definitions, but here goes.
Objects are physical entities, in the reality out there,
represented to interpretants by signs.
Signs were originally symbols that
represent objects in verbal language, but then widened to include others kinds
of sign.
Peirce’s signs include icons (which imitate objects), indicators (which reveal the effects of objects) and symbols (coded descriptions of objects).
Peirce treated interpretants as another kind of sign.
Interpretants are hard to
understand, they are not simply people.
An interpretant is perhaps primarily the effect of a sign on a person, or a meaning or understanding reached on reading a sign.
However, the concept of an intepretant seems wider, it can be an ability of an interpreter, and a sign in itself.
Interpretant: the disposition or readiness of an interpreter to respond to a sign; a sign or set of signs that interprets another sign. (Merriam Webster)
Peirce’s signs can suggest, direct or indicate meanings to interpretants.
And interpreting involves translating from one structure or behavior into another structure or behavior.
“[the interpretant] is perhaps more properly thought of as the translation or development of the original sign.
The idea is that the interpretant provides a translation of the sign, allowing us a more complex understanding of the sign's object.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
So, Peirce’s interpretant involves translating an external sign into an internal sign.
It seems to combine an interpreter’s performance of that process with the result of that process.
“In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign.
If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort.
It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
This section is edited from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Peirce divided signs into:
· Potisigns - signs that mimic the qualities of referred-to objects (e.g. a statue, or a colour chart)
· Actisigns - signs that indicate objects by representing the effects of those objects (e.g. a molehill, or the smoke of a fire)
· Famisigns - sign that encode descriptions of objects in symbols (e.g. a speech, or a symphony score).
Peirce recognised that signs convey partial, possibly inaccurate, information about objects.
He eventually addressed this by dividing objects and interpretants into immediate and dynamic kinds.
· The immediate is the object or initial understanding of it, when a sign is first perceived.
· The dynamic is the object or understanding of it at the end of a process of enquiry.
· A final interpretant, which is the ultimate, complete, agreed, perfectly true, but possibly unattainable, understanding of an object.
Peirce's 1908 letters to Lady Welby included the following ten elements and their respective sign types.
“Unfortunately, these ten divisions and their classes represent a baffling array of under-explained terminology,
and there is little to indicate precisely how we should set about the task of combining them.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
|
In respect of the |
a sign may be either |
|
Sign [See
our Type, Type signifier
and Type token] |
(i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a Famisign. |
|
Immediate Object |
(i) Descriptive (ii) Designative or (iii) a Copulant. |
|
Dynamic Object |
(i) Abstractive (ii) Concretive or (iii) Collective. |
|
relation between the Sign and the
Dynamic Object, |
(i) an Icon (ii) an Index or (iii) a Symbol. |
|
Immediate Interpretant |
(i) Ejaculative, (ii) Imperative or (iii) Significative. |
|
Dynamic Interpretant |
(i) Sympathetic (ii) Shocking or (iii) Usual. |
|
the relation between the Sign and
Dynamic Interpretant, |
(i) Suggestive (ii) Imperative or (iii) Indicative. |
|
Final Interpretant |
(i) Gratiffic (ii) Action Producing
or iii) Self-Control Producing. |
|
the relation between the Sign and the
Final Interpretant, |
(i) Seme (ii) Pheme or (iii) a Delome. |
|
the relation between the Sign, Dynamic
Object and Final Interpretant, |
(i) an Assurance of Instinct (ii) an Assurance of
Experience or (iii) an Assurance of Form. |
In seeking to reject the “essentialism” of Cartesian dualism, Popper split the world into three worlds that interact with each other:
|
Karl Popper’s three worlds view |
|
3: Products of the mind <produces> <describes/predicts> 2: Mental world <observes
and envisages> 1: Physical reality |
|
Issue:
structures in the mental world are products of the mind. Our version moves
mental models to the apex. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
|
Products of the mind <create
and use>
<represent> Minds
<observe and envisage>
Physical entity |
The
definitions below are from “The Tanner Lecture on Human Values”, Delivered at
The University of Michigan, April 7, 1978
“World 1: physical bodies
Stones, stars, plants, animals; also radiation and other forms of physical energy.
Non-living physical objects and biological objects.”
In other words, all physical matter and energy: the solar system, hurricanes, brains and all kinds of biological organism.
This must include all instantiations of world 3, such as aeroplanes and performances of the play “Hamlet”.
Does it include also the human thoughts, memories and mental models of world 2? If not, why not?
“World 2: mental or psychological world
Pain and pleasure, thoughts, decisions, perceptions, observations.
Mental states, processes, subjective experiences; conscious and subconscious experiences.”
This world seems to retain something of the internal/external Cartesian dualism Popper intended to shake off.
Let me record a thought I am about to have, in the very next sentence.
“Given a circle with a diameter of 2cm, its circumference is roughly 6.3cm.”
This objective thought started in world 2, why is my translation of that idea into writing part of world 3?
Similarly, composers (like Beethoven) can envisage and “hear” music in their heads.
Why is their translation of that mental musical sensation into a written musical score part of world 3? The one is a translation of the other.
We continually translate back and forth between internal and external, mental and documented, descriptions of world 1 and world 3
“World 3: products of the human mind
Languages, mathematical constructs, scientific conjectures and theories.
Fiction: tales, stories, myths. Art: songs, symphonies, paintings and sculptures. Engineering: aeroplanes, airports etc.”
This must include the designs of social institutions: choirs, churches, IBM, Google and the United States.
Why are products of the chimpanzee
mind not included?
Or products of the honey bee mind,
such as wiggle dances and honey comb?
And aren’t biochemical memories also
products of the mind.
Do Popper's worlds 2 and 3 reflect a subjective/objective
distinction?
You might think so, but surely this cannot be the case.
World 2 contains thoughts (which may also be recorded as writing) that
· are dreamlike, irrational, poetic or fantasies
· were widely believed to be correct, but have since been falsified by testing
· are derived by mathematical reasoning from agreed axioms
· are supported by test cases, as well as we can measure them, so far.
The position taken here is neither Cartesian nor monist, it is that of a biologist or psychologist.
The view taken today in cognitive science and psychology is that the mind has a physical biological basis
Minds and all their thoughts are products of Darwinian evolution.
Before life, there were only 1) mindless things in a mindless universe.
Today, there are also 2) life forms and 3) the descriptive products of life forms.
Tomorrow, life forms will be extinct, any descriptive products that remain will become meaningless, but the mindless things will persist.
So, the philosophy here modifies Popper’s three worlds view thus.
· World 1 The universe: all physical matter and energy (including worlds 2 and 3).
· World 2 Descriptions: models of the universe as perceived and described in terms of discrete things.
· World 3 Objective knowledge: descriptions that, when tested, match the universe well enough.
· Describers: Organisms and AI machines capable of forming and using descriptions in world 2.
The closest triangle to ours is probably a
relatively new one, Pierre Bordieu's three relations of knowledge.
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Three-relations-of-knowledge-claims_fig1_237337613.
|
Pierre Bordieu’s three relations of knowledge |
|
Knowledge <social> <epistemic> Knower <objectify> Known |
|
Issue:
knowledge is found in both memories and messages. |
|
Revised to match our triangle |
|
Knowledge <create
and use>
<represent> Actors <observe> Known things |
Bordieu's three entities look similar to ours, but are not the same,
It seems his knowers are not envisagers, and it is unclear whether a knower can create knowledge on their own.
Does his knowledge include both memories and messages?
The meanings of social
and epistemic are unclear.
Bordieu doesn’t connect his triangle to psycho-biology, system theory and philosophy as we do.
We
can see description and reality in terms of types and instances.
1. a
type - concepts or properties expressed in an intensional definition.
2. an
instance – concepts or properties embodied in an observed or
envisaged thing.
In the worlds of business and software architecture, we can see
1.
Architecture descriptions that express and
relate architectural property types.
2. Physical systems – realized by enterprises – that embody or exhibit architectural property types in particular instances.
There is a many-to-association between the two concepts – shown on the right-hand side of our triangle.
|
System
architecture |
|
Architecture
Descriptions <create and use> <represent> Architects
<observe and envisage> Physical
systems |
The ISO/IEC 42010 standard posits a third thing called “architecture” related by 1-1 associations to the first two.
Compare with the standard with cartography. What would you put in place of the questions marks.
|
ISO/IEC 42010 triangle |
Cartography |
|
1 Architecture Description <is expressed in> <identifies> 1
Architecture <is exhibited in> 1
System |
1 Map <is expressed in> <represents> 1 ??????? <is exhibited in> 1 Territory |
What is the
“architecture description” in ISO/IEC 42010?
Our mental models are relatively fragile and fuzzy, and they fade.
In writing, we can create an architectural model of a system that is beyond any model we can hold in mind.
It can be larger, more complex, consistent and coherent, as well as more stable and persistent.
ISO/IEC 42010 says it is a: “work product used to express an architecture".
OK, it is a documented form of the architecture that is formed from (but cannot be completely or perfectly remembered in) one or more architects’ minds.
The description can be a large and complex type, composed of smaller
types and primitive simple types.
|
Describer(s) |
One system description |
Many system instances |
Many physical entities |
|
Composer(s) |
A symphony score |
Many symphony performances |
Many orchestras |
|
Business architect(s) |
A set of business roles and processes |
Many businesses in operation |
Many business actors |
|
Software
engineer(s) |
A
program |
Many
program executions |
Many
computers |
|
Game
designer(s) |
The
rules of “poker” |
Many
games of poker |
Many
card schools |
In each example above, the description can be embodied or realized in
many instances - by many real-world entities.
The description is a concept, a type or
typifying assertion; and conversely, a type or typifying assertion is a
concept, is a description.
What does a system architecture
description express? The types to be instantiated in a physical system.
What does a system
embody or realize? The types expressed in an architecture description.
Who conceives the
types and translates them from a fragile mental form into a documented form?
The system architects.
What is the
“architecture” in ISO/IEC 42010?
ISO/IEC 42010 says it is a: “<system> fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its environment embodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its design and evolution"
This definition starts off referring to descriptive property types, as expressed in an architecture description.
It then shifts to a physical entity - the embodiment of those types in an observable system – and throws in some constraints on the design activity.
So, is it a Platonic ideal? Or is it real, a copy of the architecture description in some mental form?
If the architecture is ethereal, the concept of the architecture, then how could it exist before architects conceived it?
Platonic ideals are “universals” - eternal
and invariant types like “height” and “ellipse” – they never change.
There is no such universal “architecture”,
since it must change every time the “architecture description” that identifies
a “system” is changed.
Which means there are infinite architectures
for the identified system!
The concept of a Platonic ideal architecture is baffling; it adds no meaning to the description and reality of a system; it is redundant.
If the architecture is real, then
where is it? And when is it created?
Before architects
start work - there is no system or architecture – just some concerns about a
vast, indescribable and incomprehensible enterprise.
Surely the architecture gradually emerges from architects’ incomplete, fragile and fuzzy mental models of what they envisage.
Architects collate and consolidate those mental models into the form of a documented architecture description.
In this view, the architecture is one or more mental models – encoding a set of
property types in a private bio-chemical form.
And the architecture
description is a documented model – encoding the same set of
property types in a public verbal form.
Two problems with this view.
Mental models can be incoherent, fragile and transient.
Does the architecture disappear when the architect who conceived it forget its, or their mental models shift over time?
Several architects can contribute to creating one description of the same system, none holds the whole description in mind.
To posit a mental model “architecture” in 1 to 1 correspondence with a documented “architecture description” is incredible.
Which of the architects’ heads holds that complete description?
What if different architects hold different mental models?
What if one architect holds the whole description in mind, then another architect changes the documented description?
A type is a concept, is a description. A description is a concept, is a type.
A type/concept/description can be contained in a mind or in a document.
A type/concept/description only exists in a form (mental or documented) created by a typifier/conceiver/describer.
So ISO/IEC 42020 terms:
Q1) What does the architecture contain?
A1) A complex type, an integrated and coherent set of property types (in one or more mental models).
Q2) What does the architecture description express?
A2) A complex type, an integrated and coherent set of property types (in a documented model).
Q3) What does the system instantiate, embody or realize?
A3) A complex type, an integrated and coherent set of property types.
You might say:
· The architecture <consists of> architectural property types envisaged by architects.
· The architecture description <expresses> that architecture.
· The system <instantiates, embodies or realizes> that architecture and that architecture description.
Or else remove the redundant “architecture” and say:
· The documented architecture description <expresses> the mental architecture description envisaged by architects.
· Both architecture descriptions <consist of> architectural property types.
· The system <instantiates, embodies or realizes> both architecture descriptions.
What is the
“system” in ISO/IEC 42010?
Despite being a standard on describing software-intensive systems, ISO/IEC 42010 does not define what a system is.
It says: “This International Standard takes no position on what constitutes a system within those domains—or elsewhere. The nature of systems is not defined….”
OK, the standard is obliged to delegate the definition of some terms, notably system, to other ISO standards.
But the ISO standards don’t add up to a coherent or consistent whole.
And in any case, ISO/IEC 42010 doesn’t limit itself to what other ISO standards say.
Its “system” is so far generalised it could be any entity describable from different perspectives by people with different interests in it.
The standard says: “The term system is used in this International Standard to refer to entities whose architectures are of interest.”
This definition is is
so far generalized it can be applied to the description of any entity of which
different views may be drawn - be it a system or not.
The standard does not define the real target,
which is activity systems in which behaviors are performed by structures.
So, the standard could be applied to passive
structures.
The standard says: “The term is intended to encompass, but is not limited to, entities within the following domains:”
Since the standard is not limited to the
three domains below, it does not actually define what a system is.
It merely lists some possible system type and
contents, with somewhat arbitrary distinctions like between process and
procedure.
· “systems as described in [ISO/IEC 15288]: “systems that are man-made and may be configured with one or more of the following: hardware, software, data, humans, processes (e.g., processes for providing service to users), procedures (e.g. operator instructions), facilities, materials and naturally occurring entities”;
· software products and services as described in [ISO/IEC 12207];
· software-intensive systems as described in [IEEE Std 1471:2000]: “any system where software contributes essential influences to the design, construction, deployment, and evolution of the system as a whole” to encompass “individual applications, systems in the traditional sense, subsystems, systems of systems, product lines, product families, whole enterprises, and other aggregations of interest”.”
The first recommendation is to replace the 1 “architecture” by the N architects who conceive the architecture.
|
The ISO/IEC 42010 standard |
|
1 Architecture Description <is expressed
in>
<identifies> 1 Architecture
<is exhibited in> 1 System |
|
Issue: the
architecture above is a metaphysical concept |
|
Revised to match our triangle (1) |
|
1 Architecture Description <create and
use>
<represents> N Architects
<observe and envisage> 1 Systems |
OK, the standard defines everything from the perspective of 1 and only 1 Architecture Description.
But for sure one Architecture Description <can represent> many similar systems realisations.
So, the triangle could reasonably be reshaped to match our epistemological triangle thus.
|
Revised to match our triangle (2) |
|
1 Architecture Description <create and
use>
<represents> N Architects <observe and envisage> N Systems |
What the standard omits to say is different architects
may create different Architecture Descriptions of the same System.
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