Copyright
2017 Graham Berrisford. One of more than 300 papers at http://avancier.website.
Last updated 12/01/2021 08:47
This article is a
supplement to this description theory
It reviews other philosophical triangles and revises them to match our epistemological triangle.
This is not to say the existing triangles are “wrong”; all of them are mental models.
It is to suggest that, revised as suggested here, the other triangles are simpler and clearer.
Contents
Our
epistemological triangle (RECAP)
Philosophical
and semiotic views of description and reality
Four
triangular views of description and reality – in short
Ogden and
Richards’ semiotic triangle
Peirce’s
triadic sign relation
Karl Popper’s
three worlds view
Pierre
Bordieu's three relations of knowledge
A map is an abstract model or representation
of a physical territory.
The triangle below relates maps to the
territories they represent.
|
Cartography |
|
Maps <create
and use> <represent> Mappers
<observe and envisage> Territories |
Epistemology is
about what we know of reality, through observation, testing, reasoning and
learning from others.
This article uses
this triangle to relate epistemological concepts.
|
Epistemology |
|
Descriptions <create and
use> <represent> Describers <observe and envisage> Phenomena |
The triangle is only simple graphical device,
telling a small part of the story
The semantics of the triangle are defined
below.
Describers
are actors (natural or artificial) that can encode and decode descriptive
models of phenomena.
Descriptions embrace all forms of
mental, documented, digital and physical models.
Phenomena are entities, events and
processes that can be observed or envisaged in time and space.
The relationship between each pair of
concepts is many-to-many.
One describer can create several descriptions
of the same thing.
Those descriptions may be compatible or in conflict (is light waves or particles?).
Also, several describers can contribute to creating one description of the same thing.
It may well be that none of those describers (e.g. system architects) can hold the whole description in mind.
Both describers and descriptions can be observed as phenomena .
Describers are physical actors (natural or artificial), which may be described.
Descriptions are physical matter/energy structures, which can be described.
To describe a thing is to classify it (after
A J Ayer).
A description represents, specifies or
idealises a thing that embodies or instantiates the description.
A class or type represents, specifies or idealises a thing that embodies or instantiates the type.
A type is a description; a description is a type.
“Intensional definition” is the process of
creating a type or description.
A description expresses a type in the symbols of a particular language.
What gives the description meaning is the action of an actor in creating or using it.
Encoding is the process of creating the
symbols.
Decoding is the process of reading and using
the symbols.
(The encoding and decoding of information is a theme of cybernetics, after Ashby.
See article/chapter 4 for that and others ideas drawn from Ashby’s cybernetics.
Many don’t at first grasp the radical nature
of this psycho-biological and cybernetic view of description and reality.
Note especially
·
Descriptions in the mind are at the top (not the
left)
· Descriptions are often recoded into other descriptions
· Descriptions are physical phenomena
This article starts by saying “holism is not wholeism” and “the map is the territory we understand”.
All written here about systems is based on the idea that systems are patterns we abstract from physical phenomena.
This reflects the outcome of a famous debate between two mathematicians about the meaning of descriptions.
Another mathematician (to help me) has distilled the argument thus.
Frege posited that descriptions (axioms) are imperfect representations of thoughts.
And that mathematics is carried out at the level of thoughts rather than descriptions.
The presumption is that we know what geometric entities, such as points and lines, actually are.
Hilbert said that, even if we did know, this is irrelevant to understanding of geometry.
Since geometry merely defines some relations between some entities.
He argues mathematics is carried out at the level of descriptions or models.
In geometry, a description is a holistic model - it asserts that particular relationships exist between basic, unanalysed, entities
Those entities can be anything (large or small) that follow the relationships stipulated in the model.
Hilbert is now regarded as the winner of the debate, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege-hilbert/
I am told the debate is whether you regard what is described in geometry as
· a concrete entity, of which every detail is potentially relevant to answering questions about it
· an abstract set of relationships between unanalysed entities.
In other words, does geometry addresses the whole of a
thing (Frege), or only selected features of it that are describable by geometry
(Hilbert).
As related articles show, the cybernetic answer to
this question is firmly in the Hilbert camp.
Activity system thinking doesn’t address the whole of
a thing.
It addresses only those features of a physical entity
that can be represented in an abstract system description.
|
Activity systems thinking |
|
Abstract systems <create and use>
<represent> Systems
thinkers <observe and
envisage> Physical systems |
We’ll return to system architecture definition later.
Before we study triangular views, here are brief notes on two dualisms.
Cartesian dualism (after Descartes) is also based on the theory that the universe is composed of two essential substances:
· Res Cogitans: the internal or mental world – commonly called mind
· Res Extensa: the external or physical world – commonly called matter.
Arguably Cartesian dualism is really a triad - the third element being the sensors and motors of the body.
|
Cartesian dualism |
|
Minds <conceptualize> Matter And bodily sensors and motors? |
Descartes saw the mind as separate from the body.
He presumed mind and matter interact via the body.
And
having decided the physical body cannot think, he was led to declare the mind
can exist outside of the body!
Many people’s instinct is still to divide the universe into mental and
physical worlds.
But
today, cognitive psychologists see the mind as an organ
of body
And philosophers and scientists see this two-way mental/physical dichotomy as naive.
"Saussure proposed the new science semiology— later called semiotics, the science of signs.”
Saussure held that definitions of concepts cannot exist independently from a linguistic system defined by difference.
Or, to put it differently, that a concept of something cannot exist without being named."
"These various movements often lead to the notion that language 'constitutes' reality,
a position contrary to intuition and to most of the Western tradition of philosophy." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn
Descriptions, and symbols within them, are called “signs” in semiotics.
Semiology or semiotics is the study the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation.
Saussure’s
semiotics featured a two-way relation.
|
Saussure’s dyadic sign relation |
|
Signified concepts
<are signified by> Signifiers/symbols Where
are the signifiers? |
In other words: mental models <are signified by> physical models/words.
Others found this two-way view of semiotics too narrow, and developed richer triangular models.
Semiotics emerged from a linguistic paradigm that differentiates
· organic/biological patterns (as in neural systems)
· inorganic/physical patterns (as in sound waves or gestures).
The four triangles below have been proposed; none are wholly satisfactory.
Some are not well explained. (On Peirce: "a baffling array of under-explained terminology." SEP)
Some put internal mental descriptions and external spoken or written descriptions in different corners of their triangle.
All four triangles look clearer (to me anyway) when revised to match ours.
|
Ogden and Richard’s Semiotic Triangle |
Charles Peirce’s triadic sign relation |
Karl Popper’s
three worlds view |
Pierre Bordieu’s three relations of knowledge |
|
Symbols <are
symbolised by> <stand
for> References <refer
to> Referents |
Signs <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpretants <refer to> Objects |
3: Products of the mind <produces> <describes/predicts> 2: Mental world <observes
and envisages> 1: Physical reality |
Knowledge <social> <epistemic> Knower <objectify> Known |
|
Issue:
structures in the brain are symbols. Our version moves mental symbols to the
apex. |
Issue:
structures in interpreters’ minds are signs. Our version moves mental signs
to the apex. |
Issue:
structures in the mental world are products of the mind. Our version moves
mental models to the apex. |
Issue:
knowledge is contained in both memories and messages. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
Revised to match
our triangle |
Revised to match
our triangle |
Revised to match our triangle |
|
Symbols (inc.
references) <create
and use> <stand for> Referees <refer
to> Referents |
Signs (inc. interpretants) <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpreters <observe and envisage> Objects |
Products of the mind <create
and use> <represent> Minds
<observe and envisage>
Physical entity |
Knowledge <create
and use>
<represent> Actors <observe> Known things |
Our epistemological triangle moves from a sociological viewpoint to a psycho-biological one.
From the sociological: actors with a memory <express ideas using> messages to <represent> phenomena.
To the psycho-biological: actors with an intelligence <create and use> memories and messages to <represent> phenomena.
To us, all patterns (internal and external) created and used by organisms to represent things are at the apex of the triangle.
Read appendix 1 for a longer version of the analysis here.
Descartes’s view might be distilled as: mental references <are symbolised by> physical symbols, which <stand for> physical things referred to.
In “The Meaning of Meaning” (Odgen & Richards, 1923) the authors drew what might look like similar triangular structure.
However, the semiotic triangle below is rather different from Descartes.
A reference appears to be a thought or concept, as symbolised in the mind.
|
Ogden and Richard’s Semiotic Triangle |
|
Symbols <are symbolised
by> <stand for> References <refer
to> Referents |
|
Issue:
structures in the brain are symbols. Our version moves mental symbols to the
apex. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
|
Symbols (inc.
references) <create and
use> <stand for> Referees <refer
to> Referents |
A referent is something to which a symbol can refer.
A symbol is a sign (word or other representation) of something – to a creator or user of that symbol, and in a language they use.
A reference is said to be a thought or concept (as symbolised in the mind?).
On the need for language
When reading the semiotic triangle, a linguist may assume the symbols are verbal.
Of course, we and other animals can remember and communicate meaningful information without words.
The meaning of both verbal and non-verbal symbols is language dependent.
The referent/object referred to by a symbol/word depends on the language used.
Conversely, the symbol/word used to symbolise a referent/object depends on the language used.
On the need for language users
The “refer to” and “symbolised by” relations hint at processes performed by intelligent actors.
There must be actors who can not only perceive referents, and read symbols that stand for them, but also interpret those symbols using a language.
Charles Peirce (1931-1958) had similar notion to the semiotic triangle.
Sometimes it seems he conflate a describer, their intelligence, thoughts and memories into “interpretant”.
Other times it seems as though the interpretant is only a thought, concept or mental sign.
|
Charles Peirce’s
triadic sign relation |
|
Signs <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpretants <refer to> Objects |
|
Issue: structures
in interpreters’ minds are signs. Our version moves mental signs to the apex. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
|
Signs (inc. interpretants) <understand
objects from>
<represent> Interpreters <observe and envisage> Objects |
Like other philosophers, Peirce made life hard for his readers by changing his terms and their definitions, but here goes.
Objects are physical entities, in the reality out there,
represented to interpretants by signs.
Signs were originally symbols that represent objects in
verbal language, but then widened to include others kinds of sign.
Peirce’s signs include icons (which imitate objects), indicators (which reveal the effects of objects) and symbols (coded descriptions of objects).
Peirce treated interpretants as another kind of sign.
Interpretants are hard to
understand, they are not simply people.
An interpretant is perhaps primarily the effect of a sign on a person, or a meaning or understanding reached on reading a sign.
However, the concept of an intepretant seems wider, it can be an ability of an interpreter, and a sign in itself.
Interpretant: the disposition or readiness of an interpreter to respond to a sign; a sign or set of signs that interprets another sign. (Merriam Webster)
Peirce’s signs can suggest, direct or indicate meanings to interpretants.
And interpreting involves translating from one structure or behavior into another structure or behavior.
“[the interpretant] is perhaps more properly thought of as the translation or development of the original sign.
The idea is that the interpretant provides a translation of the sign, allowing us a more complex understanding of the sign's object.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
So, Peirce’s interpretant involves translating an external sign into an internal sign.
It seems to combine an interpreter’s performance of that process with the result of that process.
“In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign.
If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort.
It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
This section is edited from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Peirce divided signs into:
· Potisigns - signs that mimic the qualities of referred-to objects (e.g. a statue, or a colour chart)
· Actisigns - signs that indicate objects by representing the effects of those objects (e.g. a molehill, or the smoke of a fire)
· Famisigns - sign that encode descriptions of objects in symbols (e.g. a speech, or a symphony score).
Peirce recognised that signs convey partial, possibly inaccurate, information about objects.
He eventually addressed this by dividing objects and interpretants into immediate and dynamic kinds.
· The immediate is the object or initial understanding of it, when a sign is first perceived.
· The dynamic is the object or understanding of it at the end of a process of enquiry.
· A final interpretant, which is the ultimate, complete, agreed, perfectly true, but possibly unattainable, understanding of an object.
Peirce's 1908 letters to Lady Welby included the following ten elements and their respective sign types.
“Unfortunately, these ten divisions and their classes represent a baffling array of under-explained terminology,
and there is little to indicate precisely how we should set about the task of combining them.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
|
In respect of the |
a sign may be either |
|
Sign [See
our Type, Type signifier and Type
token] |
(i)
Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a Famisign. |
|
Immediate Object |
(i)
Descriptive (ii) Designative or (iii) a Copulant. |
|
Dynamic Object |
(i)
Abstractive (ii) Concretive or (iii) Collective. |
|
relation between the Sign and the
Dynamic Object, |
(i) an
Icon (ii) an Index or (iii) a Symbol. |
|
Immediate Interpretant |
(i)
Ejaculative, (ii) Imperative or (iii) Significative. |
|
Dynamic Interpretant |
(i) Sympathetic
(ii) Shocking or (iii) Usual. |
|
the relation between the Sign and
Dynamic Interpretant, |
(i)
Suggestive (ii) Imperative or (iii) Indicative. |
|
Final Interpretant |
(i)
Gratiffic (ii) Action Producing or iii) Self-Control Producing. |
|
the relation between the Sign and the
Final Interpretant, |
(i)
Seme (ii) Pheme or (iii) a Delome. |
|
the relation between the Sign, Dynamic
Object and Final Interpretant, |
(i) an
Assurance of Instinct (ii) an Assurance of Experience or (iii) an Assurance
of Form. |
In seeking to reject the “essentialism” of Cartesian dualism, Popper split the world into three worlds that interact with each other:
|
Karl Popper’s three worlds view |
|
3: Products of the mind <produces> <describes/predicts> 2: Mental world <observes
and envisages> 1: Physical reality |
|
Issue:
structures in the mental world are products of the mind. Our version moves
mental models to the apex. |
|
Revised to match
our triangle |
|
Products of the mind <create
and use>
<represent> Minds
<observe and envisage>
Physical entity |
The
definitions below are from “The Tanner Lecture on Human Values”, Delivered at
The University of Michigan, April 7, 1978
“World 1: physical bodies
Stones, stars, plants, animals; also radiation and other forms of physical energy.
Non-living physical objects and biological objects.”
In other words, all physical matter and energy: the solar system, hurricanes, brains and all kinds of biological organism.
This must include all instantiations of world 3, such as aeroplanes and performances of the play “Hamlet”.
Does it include also the human thoughts, memories and mental models of world 2? If not, why not?
“World 2: mental or psychological world
Pain and pleasure, thoughts, decisions, perceptions, observations.
Mental states, processes, subjective experiences; conscious and subconscious experiences.”
This world seems to retain something of the internal/external Cartesian dualism Popper intended to shake off.
Let me record a thought I am about to have, in the very next sentence.
“Given a circle with a diameter of 2cm, its circumference is roughly 6.3cm.”
This objective thought started in world 2, why is my translation of that idea into writing part of world 3?
Similarly, composers (like Beethoven) can envisage and “hear” music in their heads.
Why is their translation of that mental musical sensation into a written musical score part of world 3? The one is a translation of the other.
We continually translate back and forth between internal and external, mental and documented, descriptions of world 1 and world 3
“World 3: products of the human mind
Languages, mathematical constructs, scientific conjectures and theories.
Fiction: tales, stories, myths. Art: songs, symphonies, paintings and sculptures. Engineering: aeroplanes, airports etc.”
This must include the designs of social institutions: choirs, churches, IBM, Google and the United States.
Why are products of the chimpanzee
mind not included?
Or products of the honey bee mind,
such as wiggle dances and honey comb?
And aren’t biochemical memories also
products of the mind.
Do Popper's worlds 2 and 3 reflect a subjective/objective
distinction?
You might think so, but surely this cannot be the case.
World 2 contains thoughts (which may also be recorded as writing) that
· are dreamlike, irrational, poetic or fantasies
· were widely believed to be correct, but have since been falsified by testing
· are derived by mathematical reasoning from agreed axioms
· are supported by test cases, as well as we can measure them, so far.
The position taken here is neither Cartesian nor monist, it is that of a biologist or psychologist.
The view taken today in cognitive science and psychology is that the mind has a physical biological basis
Minds and all their thoughts are products of Darwinian evolution.
Before life, there were only 1) mindless things in a mindless universe.
Today, there are also 2) life forms and 3) the descriptive products of life forms.
Tomorrow, life forms will be extinct, any descriptive products that remain will become meaningless, but the mindless things will persist.
So, the philosophy here modifies Popper’s three worlds view thus.
· World 1 The universe: all physical matter and energy (including worlds 2 and 3).
· World 2 Descriptions: models of the universe as perceived and described in terms of discrete things.
· World 3 Objective knowledge: descriptions that, when tested, match the universe well enough.
· Describers: Organisms and AI machines capable of forming and using descriptions in world 2.
The closest triangle to ours is probably a
relatively new one, Pierre Bordieu's three relations of knowledge.
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Three-relations-of-knowledge-claims_fig1_237337613.
|
Pierre Bordieu’s three relations of knowledge |
|
Knowledge <social> <epistemic> Knower <objectify> Known |
|
Issue:
knowledge is found in both memories and messages. |
|
Revised to match our triangle |
|
Knowledge <create
and use>
<represent> Actors <observe> Known things |
Bordieu's three entities look similar to ours, but are not the same,
It seems his knowers are not envisagers, and it is unclear whether a knower can create knowledge on their own.
Does his knowledge include both memories and messages?
The meanings of social
and epistemic are unclear.
Bordieu doesn’t connect his triangle to psycho-biology, system theory and philosophy as we do.
This article is a
supplement to this description theory.
Where this general
triangle is used to relate describers and descriptions to what is described.
|
Episteomology |
|
Descriptions <create and use> <represent> Describers
<observe
and envisage> Phenomena |
This article reviews
other philosophical triangles and revises them to match our epistemological
triangle.
E.g. it revises the
classic semiotic triangle, and Peirce’s triadic sign relation, to match the new
triangle.
This is not to say the
existing triangles are “wrong”; all of them are mental models.
It is to suggest
that, revised as suggested here, the other triangles are simpler and clearer
(or perhaps, they should be turned into squares).
Finally, people ask
about my personal view of other philosophers.
At the risk of
upsetting people, here are some glib thoughts.
·
Plato,
Aristotle and Descarte – superseded.
·
Metaphysical and theological philosophy
(e.g. Kierkgaard) - on a different planet.
·
Political philosophy (e.g.
Engels and de Beauvoir) - tendentious.
·
Linguistic-based philosophy – too human-centric.
·
Heraclitus
and Kant – close to my philosophy
·
Charles
Darwin and W Ross Ashby - my
touchstones.
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